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Abstract 
 
The paper postulates that in an environment of continuous financial reforms, the lending 
rate stickiness in an economy could be changing over the period. The financial reforms 
(of which deregulation of interest rates formed a major part) during the 1990s and the 
early 2000s and the changing role attributed to different policy rates during the reforms 
make India an interesting case study. The paper finds evidence of diminishing lending 
rate stickiness in case of India. During the major part of the study, Indian policymakers 
used the discount rate for policy signaling. The paper observes that as a result, the long-
term rates like the lending rates did not react sufficiently to the changes in the short-term 
rates (e.g., repo rate) in this period unless the discount rate was also changed. Such 
behavior changed when policymakers started to use short-term rates like repo rates for 
policy signaling. Results in this paper suggest that when the impacts are added together, 
a change of 100 basis points in all policy rates towards the end of the reference period 
could change the lending rate in India almost by similar magnitude. These findings help 
to reconcile some of the contrasting findings on lending rate stickiness in case of India. 
Among possible factors still responsible for lending rate stickiness, the study identifies 
inelastic credit demand in India as an important factor. From policymaking perspective, 
however, it is postulated that as demand for personal and housing loans in India are 
likely to increase in future due to demographic factor, it is likely that such increase could 
tend to increase inflexibility in loan rates. 
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Stability of Lending Rate Stickiness: A Case Study of India 
 
 
1   Introduction 
 
The current paradigm in monetary policy postulates that the changes in the short-
term central bank rates would translate towards the longer end of the yield curve, 
leading to changes in the rates offered by the banking sector and hence, in 
aggregate demand. However, in reality, when the short-term official interest rates 
in an economy change, long-term rates like lending rates may or may not 
respond by the same amount. Further, the change – if at all it takes place – may 
not be contemporaneous, but lagged. This problem of “stickiness” of lending rate 
has received considerable attention in recent years (Hannan and Berger, 1991; 
Lowe and Rohling, 1992; Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Cotttarelli et al, 1995; 
Moazzami, 1999; Mahadeva and Sinclair, 2001; Berstein and Fuentes, 2004).1 
 
Empirical estimates of lending rate stickiness vary across countries. A major 
factor is the extent of use of discount rate as policy signals in addition to the use 
of short-term official rates (e.g., repo rates) by the monetary authorities (Cottarelli 
and Kouleris, 1994). In countries where an active discount rate policy is pursued, 
the so called 'discount rate addiction' by the banking sector has been found to be 
responsible for the stickiness of lending rate.2 The stickiness could also be due to 
inelastic loan demands because higher the elasticity, higher is the opportunity 
cost of keeping loan rates in disequilibrium. Some other structural determinants 
of lending rate stickiness are: (i) competition in the banking system, (ii) state of 
development of financial markets and, (iii) banking system ownership, (iv) 
adverse selection, (v) borrowers‟ preference for stable interests, (vi) switching 
costs leading to market segmentation and (vii) consumer irrationality (Lowe and 
Rohling, 1992; Cottarelli and Kouleris, 1994; Mahadeva and Sinclair, 2001).  
 
Despite progress in understanding, a major problem that has not been addressed 
in sufficient detail in the literature is the stability of lending rate stickiness. Given 
that during the 1990s many countries progressed towards market oriented 
economies, this issue assumes further significance. Structural reforms in these 
countries might have led to changes in the process of monetary policy 
transmission. Important aspects of these reforms were to move away from direct 
to indirect monetary policy measures and also to rely more on central bank 
interest rates to signal policy changes (Van‟t dack, 1999). It is likely that 
                                                          
1
 The word "stickiness" in the context of interest rates has two different connotations. The first implies that 
changes in the long term rates (e.g., deposit or lending rates) charged by banks are relatively less than 
changes in money market rates. The second indicates that the rates charged by banks are relatively inelastic 
with respect to shifts in demand for bank loans and deposits. In this paper, we use both connotations, 
initially the first one and then the second.  
2
Discount rate addiction reflects the situation where the banking sector reacts more strongly to changes in 
the discount rate rather than the official short-term rate. Cross-country estimates of Cottarelli and Kourelis 
(1994) reveal that if a change in money market rates is not accompanied by a change in the discount rate, 
the stickiness of the lending rate increases by 10 to 15 basis points. 
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stickiness in lending rates in such countries would not be constant, but stabilize 
gradually over time as the journey towards market determined economy nears 
culmination. 
 
This paper examines the behavior of lending rate stickiness in India. We not only 
examine how quickly and to what extent lending rates changed following a 
change in the central bank interest rates in India, but also the stability of such 
movements. India would be a useful case study because interest rate structure in 
India experienced a radical change during the 1990s. Prior to the 1990s, the 
financial markets in India were segmented and lacked depth. The interest rates 
were administered and had multiple layers. Interestingly, the first attempt to free 
the interest rate structure in India during the early 1980s was not successful, and 
a common view on its failure was that it was not done in conjunction with much 
needed reforms in the other sectors of the economy (Malhotra, 1997).3 In 
contrast, the interest rate reforms during the 1990s were adopted slowly but 
steadily in a sequential manner along with other reforms that focused on the 
overall development of money, government securities and foreign exchange 
markets.4 The vision was to move away from the use of direct instruments of 
monetary control to indirect measures such as open market operations and 
market related interest rates. The first stage of interest rate reforms in India 
culminated in the reactivation of the Bank Rate (BR) in April 1997, when in a 
sweeping change, the BR was linked to all other interest rates, including the 
Reserve Bank's refinance rate.  
 
In view of these reforms, from the Indian perspective, an examination of lending 
rate stickiness assumes significance. Earlier studies like Mahadeva and Sinclair 
(2001) that examined this problem separately for many countries questioned the 
effectiveness of the interest rate channel in case of India. The reference period in 
case of India in Mahadeva and Sinclair (2001), however, included data from the 
1980s, when interest rates in India were administered. Recent India-specific 
studies of Prasad and Ghosh (2005b), in contrast, highlight the increasing role of 
interest rate in corporate performance. Interestingly, these apparently 
contradictory findings would be consistent if it can be demonstrated that lending 
rate stickiness in India has been decreasing gradually over time.5 This paper 
                                                          
3
 The genesis and the early road map of interest rate reforms in India could be attributed to the "Report of 
the Committee to Review the Working of the Monetary System" chaired by Professor Sukhamoy 
Chakravarty in 1985 [henceforth referred as Chakravarty (1985)]. This was followed by the "Report of the 
Working Group on Money Market" in 1987 and the "Report of the Committee on the Financial System" in 
1991 (popularly known as Vaghul Committee and Narasimham Committee respectively, henceforth 
referred as Vaghul (1987) and Narasimham (1991)]. 
4
On the lending side, the deregulation began in 1994. Banks were given freedom to set their own Prime 
Lending Rates (PLR) and to devise their own lending policies. On the liabilities side, the entire gamut of 
deposit rates – except on savings deposits – were deregulated and banks were given freedom to offer 
different interest rates for different maturities/size-groups.  The interest rates on government papers were 
also made market related. Further, the Reserve Bank's refinance facility was rationalized and the sector 
specific refinance facilities were de-emphasized.   
5
 The „signal rate‟ was changed from the Bank Rate (i.e., the discount rate) to the repo rate in 2005. 
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examines these problems. It also attempts to assess the importance of some 
other factors that could potentially influence the stickiness in lending rate in India.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 of the paper presents the analytical 
framework. Section 3 empirically examines the nature and the extent of lending 
rate stickiness prevailing in India. The underlying factors behind lending rate 
stickiness in India have been addressed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 
summarizes the main findings and analyzes the policy implications of these 
findings. 
 
 
2   The Analytical Framework  
 
The studies that examine the relationship between official and market related 
rates could be of different types, depending on whether the focus is on more than 
one country or a single country. Multi-country models like Cottarelli and Kourelis 
(1994) are panel data models that attempt to identify country-specific structural 
factors by including measures pertaining to them as explanatory variables in the 
models. However, sometimes despite using cross-country observations, separate 
models for countries have also been specified (Lowe and Rohling, 1992; 
Moazzami, 1999; Mahadeva and Sinclair, 2001). In contrast, when the focus is 
on a single country, the choice is generally restricted to time series models 
(Cottarelli et al, 1995; Heffernan, 1997).6 The analytical framework adopted is 
consistent with the time series approach. 
 
In a time series framework, analysis of lending rate stickiness can be carried out 
using a vector autoregression (VAR) framework. If the different rates are 
cointegrated then, vector error correction models (VECMs) may also be specified 
(Heffernan, 1997).7 The cointegrating relationship helps to identify the "long-run" 
or the "equilibrium" relationship between the short and the long-term rates. In 
addition, the error correction equation in the VECM helps to estimate short-term 
or impact multipliers as against the long-term or full equilibrium multipliers. These 
models also estimate the speed of adjustment of lending rates.  
 
The behavior of lending rate in a single country can also be analyzed through 
single equation autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models (Cottarelli et al, 
1995; Moazzami, 1999). To allow for the presence of lags in the adjustment of 
lending rates to changes in the money market rates, in this paper we specify the 
following ADL model: 
 
                                                          
6
 Recently, attempts have been made to examine lending rate stickiness with micro-level banking data for a 
single country, e.g., Bernstein and Fuentes (2004) for Chile. 
7
 Focus of these models is more general as they examine the relationship among an array of interest rates. 
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where rt  and mt are lending rate and the money market rate at time t and u t  is 
the error term. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) used a similar model and derived 
sets of multipliers reflecting the adjustment of the lending rate at different time 
lags. Equation (1) may also contain a set of other variables. For example, if 
discount rate is perceived as an important determinant of the lending rate, 
changes in the discount rate and its lags may be included (Cottarelli and 
Kourelis, 1994). Similarly, if the empirical analysis is carried out over a long time 
span, some other variables incorporating structural changes may also be 
considered. 
 
In equation (1), the coefficient 0 measures the short-run or impact effect of 
changes in the money market rates on lending rates. The long-run or full 
equilibrium effect of changes in the money market rates on lending rates is equal 
to: 
 
 
Estimating equation (1), one can obtain short-run and long-run effects of changes 
in money market rates on lending rates. The presence of lending rate stickiness 
can be examined by testing the hypothesis that the short-run impact coefficients 
are less than unity. The extent of long-run adjustment of lending rates to the 
money market rates can be examined by testing the null hypothesis of H0:  = 1.  
 
Empirically, the model described in equation (1) can be estimated through 
ordinary least squares (OLS). To have parsimony, the insignificant lags in 
equation (1) may be dropped from the model. In fact, the empirical estimation 
procedure can be based on a general to specific modelling approach as in 
Clements and Hendry (1998). 
 
Testing the long-run hypothesis based on the OLS estimate of model in equation 
(1) is, however, computationally inefficient since we not only have to calculate the 
long-run coefficient , but also have to compute its standard error in order to test 
the null hypothesis of no lending rate stickiness. Clearly, it would be better if we 
can estimate  along with its standard error directly. This can be done by writing 
(1) in a form proposed by Wickens and Breusch (1988):  
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Here, equation (3) is an extended version of the error correction model 
popularized by Hendry (1986), suggesting that changes in the lending rates over 
time are from two sources. First they respond to a lag to changes in the official 
interest rates.  Second, they respond to deviation from their long-run relationship. 
Here, (3) is in the error-correction form and suggests that (1 - i) of the 
disequilibrium between lending rates and money market rates is adjusted for in 
each period. Estimating equation (3), we can directly obtain the short-run impact 
multiplier 0 along with the long-rum multiplier  and the speed of adjustment as 
revealed by (1 - i).  
 
Finally, in this paper, stability in the estimated coefficients is examined in a rolling 
regression framework. The rolling regressions have been carried out with a 
moving window (i.e., number of observations in each regression has been kept 
constant by deleting and adding one observation each). Series corresponding to 
the relevant coefficients have been constructed from these regressions. A few 
equations pertaining to important sub-periods have also been reported.  
 
 
3   The Relationship between Official Rates and the Lending Rate in India 
 
The reference period considered in this study is: April 1997 to March 2006. The 
beginning of our reference period roughly coincides with the completion of the 
first stage of monetary policy reforms in India. Further, April 1997 also coincides 
with the reactivation of BR. Based on the relative importance attached to different 
policy rates, the entire period may be divided into three sub-periods. During the 
first sub-period (April 1997 to May 2000), BR was the most important policy rate. 
This period could be considered as an early stage in the second generation of 
monetary policy reforms in India. At this stage, attempts were being made to 
create appropriate corridors for the short-term money market rates.  
 
The next sub-period (June 2000 to March 2005) is the period in which the 
corridor for short-term money market rates was well established through Liquidity 
Adjustment Facility (LAF). The RBI used both the short-term reverse repo rate 
(RREPO) and the BR actively during this period. While the first was used to 
stabilize the financial markets, the second reflected the medium to long-run 
perspective of the central bank. Subsequently, with the sharp decline in recourse 
to central bank refinance (at rates linked to BR), there was a shift in emphasis on 
managing short-term liquidity. During the later half of 2004, RBI observed that the 
repo / reverse repo rates had become “potent tools for signaling the stance of 
monetary policy and defining an informal corridor of short-term interest rates” 
(Reserve Bank of India, 2004, Box III.1, p. 108).8 One of the internal studies in 
RBI also suggested around this time that “it would be desirable to de-emphasise 
the passive sterilization attribute of the LAF repo facility so that it could emerge 
                                                          
8
 Till October 2004, Repo (Reverse Repo) conducted by the central bank meant liquidity absorption 
(injection) in India. It may be noted that this was opposite to international convention. RBI changed to 
international convention in October 2004 after suitable notifications in its policy documents. Throughout 
this paper, international convention has been followed.   
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as the exclusive policy signaling rate” (Para 69, Mid-Term Review, Reserve Bank 
of India, October 26, 2004). Subsequently, in April 28, 2005, RBI explained that 
 
“On Balance of considerations, the Reserve Bank raised CRR and the reverse 
repo rate moderately to signal its strong commitment to price stability” 
            (Annual Policy Statement for the Year 2005-06, Para 48, emphasis added)    
 
Thus, from April 2005, the dichotomy of the twin policy rates was somewhat 
removed as RREPO was explicitly used to signal the central bank‟s policy 
stance. This could be the third and the final sub-period in our reference period. In 
the subsequent empirical analysis, however, we have combined the second and 
the third period as the number of observations in the third period is too small to 
be analyzed separately. 
 
 
Figure 1: Movements in Reverse Repo Rate, Bank Rate, 
Call Money Rate and Lending Rate
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In the subsequent empirical analysis, we have considered four interest rates. 
Among these, RREPO and BR are central bank rates and LENDRATE is the 
average of the minimum and the maximum prime lending rates (PLR) reported by 
banks. As a significant part in our study includes the period in which attempt to 
construct appropriate corridors for short-term interest rates was going on in India, 
we have also included call money rate (CALL) in the domain of our analysis. As 
call money rate in India was volatile sporadically, monthly average figures for 
them were considered. All other three rates in the study are, in contrast, rates on 
the last working day of a month. All data used in this study are published by RBI 
on regular basis. Figure 1 presents the movements of RREPO, CALL, BR and 
lending rate (LENDRATE) in India during the reference period.  
 
Figure 1 reveals a close association between BR and LENDRATE for the entire 
period. After the introduction of LAF in June 2000, LENDRATE appears to have a 
close association with RREPO as well. In Table 1, we examine the nature and 
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the extent of change in LENDRATE after a change in either of these policy rates. 
Table 1 reveals that the initial change of LENDRATE in response to a change in 
BR was generally carried out within the next month. Similar relationship with 
RREPO, however, was not very clear from Table 1. 
 
Table 2 presents the relationship of all other rates with LENDRATE in further 
details. In Table 2, contemporaneous and lagged correlations of all the other 
rates with LENDRATE are presented. Table 2 reveals that the contemporaneous 
correlation between LENDRATE and CALL is 0.41. Correlations of the first three 
lags of CALL with LENDRATE also vary within a range of 0.38–0.41. Two major 
factors for the low correlations between LENDRATE and CALL are possibly (i) 
the trend in LENDRATE and, (ii) the high volatility of CALL during the reference 
period. Between April 1997 and March 2006, LENDRATE generally experienced 
a downward trend, while CALL fluctuated over a wide range between 1.22 and 
28.70. The high value of 28.70 was in January 1998 – during the South-East 
Asian crisis that led to a sudden change in monetary tightening by the RBI. 
Excluding that outlier, CALL moved in and around BR and was generally lower 
than the LENDRATE. In fact, between April 1998 and March 2006 – a period that 
excludes the outlier – the contemporaneous and cross-correlations between 
LENDRATE and CALL were in the range of 0.60–0.70. 
 
Interestingly, the contemporaneous correlation of LENDRATE with CALL is 
also moderate at 0.51, while cross-correlations of LENDRATE with lags of 
CALL are negligible. This is probably because of a moderate degree of 
correlation between LENDRATE and CALL at the change points of LENDRATE. 
Correlations of LENDRATE with RREPO and RREPO are also modest. 
 
The contemporaneous and lagged correlations between LENDRATE and BR are, 
however, very high and decrease from 0.97 to 0.82. Contemporaneous 
correlation between LENDRATE and BR is moderate at 0.56. The same for 
first lag of BR is also moderate (0.39), but that with higher lags of BR are 
small.  
 
Figure 1, Table 1 and Table 2 together reveal a certain degree of lending rate 
stickiness along with discount rate addiction in the Indian economy. Simple 
calculations also reveal that between April 1997 and March 2006, BR has 
decreased by 500 basis points. Such a change, however, has brought a 375 
basis point change in LENDRATE, implying that a 100 basis point change in BR 
ushers about 75 basis point change in LENDRATE in the long-run. 
 
ADF tests for the presence of unit root in RREPO, CALL, BR and LENDRATE 
reveal some interesting features. The results presented in Table 3 reveal that 
both BR and LENDRATE may be characterized as an I(1) series based on the 
data for the entire period. For RREPO, the evidence is not as strong, though it 
may still be considered as an I(1) series at 5.0 per cent level of significance. 
Interestingly, the series CALL strongly displays characteristics of an I(0) series 
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for the entire period, as well as for the period April 1997 to May 2000. This result 
is, in fact, somewhat contrary to international evidence. Internationally, money 
market rates have been found to be I(1) series (Heffernan, 1997), leading to a 
specification of appropriate VECM models. The stationarity could be due to the 
outlier in January 1998, when call shot up to 28.70 per cent in January 1998, but 
the change was not persistent. Still, as we find evidence that the series CALL 
may be an I(0) series, modelling strategy in the Indian context will have to be 
somewhat different. Table 3 also reveals that sub-period specific tests of 
stationarity of the series, in many cases, are conflicting. 
 
Table 1: Changes in Official Rates and the Lending Rate 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Changes in Official Rates             Changes in Lending Rate______          
Month      BR      RRepo        Month 0   Month 1  Month 2  Month 3 
 (1)      (2)       (3)           (4)       (5)     (6)      (7)    
_______________________________________________________________________ 
May-97      0      +235             0        0     -75        0 
Jun-97   -100       -75             0      -75       0        0 
Jul-97      0       -40           -75        0       0        0 
Sep-97      0       +75             0        0     -75        0 
Oct-97   -100       -35             0      -75       0     +125 
Nov-97      0       +50           -75        0    +125        0 
Dec-97      0      +250             0     +125       0        0 
Jan-98   +200      +200          +125        0       0      -25 
Mar-98    -50      -100             0      -25     -37      -50 
Apr-98   -150      -100           -25      -37     -50        0 
Jun-98      0      -100           -50        0       0        0 
Aug-98      0      +300             0        0       0        0 
Mar-99   -100      -200           -38      -50       0        0 
Apr-00   -100      -100           -75        0       0        0 
Jun-00      0      +525             0        0     +75        0 
Jul-00   +100      -225             0      +75       0        0 
Aug-00      0      +575           +75        0       0        0 
Sep-00      0      -375             0        0       0        0 
Oct-00      0      -200             0        0       0        0 
Feb-01   -100       -50           -50        0       0        0 
Mar-01      0       -50             0        0       0        0 
Apr-01      0       -25             0        0       0        0 
May-01      0       -25             0        0       0        0 
Oct-01    -50         0             0        0       0        0 
Mar-02      0       -50             0        0       0        0 
Jun-02      0       -25             0        0       0        0 
Oct-02    -25       -25           -38        0       0        0 
Mar-03      0       -50             0        0     -13        0 
May-03    -25         0           -13        0       0        0 
Aug-03      0       -50             0        0       0        0 
Oct-04      0       +25             0        0       0        0 
Apr-05      0       +25             0        0       0        0 
Oct-05      0       +25             0        0       0        0 
Jan-06      0       +25             0        0       0        - 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The changes are reported in basis points. Here Month 0 is the 
contemporaneous month. Similarly, Month 1, Month 2 and Month 3 reflect 
the changes in LENDRATE after one, two and three months respectively.  
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     Table 2: Contemporaneous and Lagged Correlations 
 
Correlations / Lags 
(1) 
Lag 0 
(2) 
Lag 1 
(3) 
Lag 2 
(4) 
Lag 3 
(5) 
LENDRATE with         
RREPO 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.26 
CALL 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.38 
BR 0.97 0.93 0.88 0.82 
∆LENDRATE with          
∆RREPO 0.39 0.18 0.15 -0.01 
∆CALL 0.51 0.04 0.04 0.03 
∆BR 0.56 0.39 0.09 -0.12 
 
 
Table 3: Results of ADF Tests 
__________________________________________________________ 
                                 ADF         ADF            Joint Test 
Series              Min. Lag    t-test      z-test      Unit Root& No Trend 
 (1)                  (2)         (3)        (4)               (5) 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Apr-97 to May-00 
CALL                  9        -7.07 #      9.73 #          26.12 # 
RREPO                 1        -2.27      -11.87             2.74 @ 
BR                    5        -4.38 #     27.35 #           9.63 # 
LENDRATE              4        -3.71 @     68.73 #           6.96 @ 
Jun-00 to Mar-06 
CALL                  1        -1.39       -5.99             1.16 
RREPO                 4        -3.63@     -42.85 #           6.66 @ 
BR                    7        -0.56       -1.60             0.59 
LENDRATE              4        -2.77      -24.50 @           3.95 
Apr-97 to Mar-06 
CALL                   1       -5.83 #    -60.38 #          17.12 # 
RREPO                  4       -3.89 @    -31.55 #           7.99 @ 
BR                    14       -1.02       -2.49             3.55  
LENDRATE               8       -0.93       -2.32             2.45 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Note : Here #, @ and $ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
       respectively. Minimum lag has been chosen by the AIC criterion. 
 
 
To tackle the problem of stationarity, all equations in this section have been 
estimated in an ADL framework. The estimated equations of LENDRATE (on its 
own lag, CALL and lagged CALL) for different sub-periods are presented in Table 
4. It may be noted that CALL had an outlier in January 1998 that severely 
distorted the empirical relationship between April 1997 to May 2000. In column 
(2) of Table 4, the coefficient of LENDRATE(-1) was more than unity, rendering 
any calculations for multipliers and speed of adjustment coefficients 
meaningless. Excluding the outlier period, a separate equation from April 1998 to 
May 2000 has also been reported in Table 4. It may be noted that all the 
equations in Table 4 can be written in error correction form as described in 
Section 2. The long-run stickiness coefficients and the speed of adjustments for 
different models have also been calculated and reported in Table 4. 
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Table 4 reveals that while CALL affects LENDRATE significantly, the immediate 
impact is small and not more than 10 basis points on average. Expectedly, only 
persistent liquidity problems lead to an increase in LENDRATE. The steady state 
impact for different periods in columns (3) to (5) are moderate and within 40 to 80 
basis points. The estimated equation in column (2) and hence the long-run 
stickiness coefficient have been clearly affected by the outlier in CALL in January 
1998 that occurred due to extraneous factors. 
 
So far as the estimated relationships between (i) LENDRATE and RREPO and 
(ii) LENDRATE and BR are concerned, the estimated equations in the ADL 
framework have been presented in Table 5.   
 
 
Table 4: Relationship between LENDRATE and CALL 
 
Variables / Period 
 
 
(1) 
Apr-97 
 to  
May-00 
(2) 
Apr-98 
to 
May-00 
(3) 
Jun-00 
to 
Mar-06 
(4) 
Apr-97 
to  
Mar-06 
(5) 
Constant 
-0.7479 
(-1.22) 
0.2328 
(0.24) 
0.8477 
(2.24)@ 
0.5537 
(3.26)# 
LENDRATE(–1) 
1.0144 
(22.63)# 
0.9434 
(14.63)# 
0.9032 
(23.41)# 
0.9253 
(59.71)# 
Call 
0.0656 
(6.53)# 
0.0914 
(2.44)@ 
0.0745 
(6.06)# 
0.0561 
(9.20)# 
Call(-1) 
-0.0075 
(-0.79) 
-0.0466 
(-1.31) 
-0.0397 
(-2.81)# 
-0.0147 
(-2.35)@ 
Impact Multiplier --- 0.09 0.07 0.06 
Long-run Stickiness 
Coefficient 
--- 0.79 0.36 0.55 
Speed of Adjustment 
Coefficient 
--- 0.06 0.10 0.07 
No of Observations 38 26 70 108 
R-Square 0.94 0.92 0.96 0.98 
R-Bar Sq 0.93 0.90 0.96 0.98 
D-W Statistics 2.09 1.95 1.68 1.77 
Note: The bracketed terms are t-statistics. Here, #, @ and $ indicate 
significance at 1.0, 5.0 and at 10.0 per cent respectively. X(-k) 
indicate the value of X at the k-th lag. All subsequent tables and 
equations follow similar convention. 
As per Table 5, the impact multiplier of RREPO is small and less than 20 basis 
points. The impact multiplier for BR is somewhat larger and varies between 35 
and 45 basis points for different periods. As an illustration, consider the equation 
in column (7) of Table 5. The impact multiplier and the long-run multiplier of this 
equation work out to be 0.35 and 0.71 respectively. Thus a 100 basis point 
change in BR is likely to bring an average contemporaneous change in 
LENDRATE by 35 basis points, while the long-run adjustment is about 71 basis 
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points. The result appears to be consistent with our earlier descriptive analysis.  
The result is also close to Mahadeva and Sinclair (2001), who arrived at an 
estimate of about 70 basis points long-run adjustment of the lending rate in 
response to 100 basis points change in the official rates for the Indian economy.  
 
 
Table 5: Relationship of LENDRATE with RREPO and BR 
 
Variables / 
Period 
 
(1) 
Apr-97 
 to  
May-00 
(2) 
Jun-00 
to 
Mar-06 
(3) 
Apr-97 
to 
Mar-06 
(4) 
Apr-97 
 to  
May-00 
(5) 
Jun-00 
to 
Mar-06 
(6) 
Apr-97 
to 
Mar-06 
(7) 
Constant 
0.0366 
(-0.35) 
1.0534 
(3.12)# 
0.3766 
(1.87)$ 
3.8423 
(5.14)# 
0.7739 
(2.15)@ 
2.1518 
(5.61)# 
LENDRATE(-1) 
0.9495 
(16.80)# 
0.8758 
(25.42)# 
0.9379 
(52.90)# 
0.3215 
(2.95)# 
0.8527 
(17.54)# 
0.6652 
(11.69)# 
RREPO 
0.1930 
(3.87)# 
0.0732 
(6.58) 
0.1057 
(5.92)# 
      
RREPO(-1) 
-0.1081 
(-2.34)@ 
-0.0197 
(-1.56) 
-0.0530 
(-3.02)# 
   
BR       
0.4261 
(7.20)# 
0.2618 
(3.70)# 
0.3534 
(7.86)# 
BR(-1)    
0.1125 
(1.23)$ 
-0.1300 
(-1.63) 
-0.1155 
(-1.99)@ 
Impact 
Multiplier 
0.19 0.07 0.11 0.43 0.26 0.35 
Long-Run 
Stickiness 
Coefficient 
1.68 0.43 0.85 0.79 0.89 0.71 
Speed of 
Adjustment 
Coefficient 
0.05 0.12 0.06 0.68 0.15 0.33 
No of Obs. 38 70 108 38 70 108 
R-Square 0.90 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.98 
R-Bar Sq 0.89 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.98 
D-W Statistic 2.44 1.74 2.15 2.35 2.27 2.04 
 
           
 
It may be noted that the specification in Section 2 also enables us to examine the 
effect of RREPO and BR together. The estimated equation in ADL form for the 
entire period is presented in equation (4) below: 
 
(4) LENDRATE  = 1.6820 + 0.73 LENDRATE (–1) + 0.06 RREPO +  
                                                 (4.22)#    (12.43)#                                        (3.33)# 
 
    0.29 BR – 0.03 RREPO(–1) – 0.11 BR(–1) 
                                                         (6.28)#           (-1.91)$                             (-1.91)$ 
 R Square = 0.98, R-Bar Square = 0.98, D-W Statistic = 2.08 
 
  
  
13 
The long-run stickiness for RREPO and BR in equation (4) work out to be 0.11 
and 0.67, with impact multipliers 0.06 and 0.29 respectively. Together, these 
figures work out to be 0.78 and 0.35, implying a 100 basis point increase in both 
RREPO and BR would usher a near immediate increase of 35 basis points in 
LENDRATE. In the long run, the change is expected to be about 75–80 basis 
points. Interestingly, the above equation reveals the importance of BR during the 
reference period. The Indian example, therefore, is a classical case of discount 
rate addiction. It may however be noted that the explicit move to make RREPO 
the policy rate might have led to another important structural change circa late 
2004. However, the number of observations in our reference period is not yet 
long-enough to propose a rigorous test for this change. 
 
To examine this change, a rolling regression framework may, however, be 
specified. For this purpose, the specification in equation (4) was estimated with a 
moving window of 90 observations (e.g., the first regression was based on data 
from April 1997 to October 2004, the next from May 1997 to November 2004 
etc.). Figure 2 presents the 18 long-run and the short-run multipliers plotted along 
the end-points of these regressions. It may be noted that the time period in the X-
axis of Figure 2 roughly coincides with the period in which the move towards 
signaling through RREPO was initiated. In Figure 2, LONGMUL and IMPMUL are 
the long-run and short-run multipliers, respectively indicating the long and 
immediate impact of a 100 basis points simultaneous rise in RREPO and BR.  
 
In Figure 2, both LONGMUL and IMPMUL rise – first gradually and then sharply 
– till April 2005. From May 2005 onwards, however, both the coefficients display 
stability. Although it is too early to come to a firm conclusion, at least, it is 
possible to hypothesize that the stability of the two coefficients in Figure 2 could 
be due to possible culmination of interest rate reforms in India. 
 
Incidentally, the cross-country panel study of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) points 
out that the degree of stickiness, on average, is relatively high for a number of 
countries. In three-fourth of the cases, the long-run multiplier obtained by 
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) was between 0.75–1.25. The impact multiplier was 
typically one-third of the long-run multiplier. The long-run multipliers for India 
obtained from different equations are on the lower side of the general 
international standard. Cross-country experiences also reveal that the speed of 
adjustment of the lending rate is slow. On average, after one and two quarters, 
about one-third and one-fourth of the adjustments remain to be completed. The 
estimated relationships in case of India appear to be consistent with earlier 
findings. Empirical results in case of India, however, suggest the weakening of 
the stickiness in recent years.  
 
4 Underlying Factors behind Lending Rate Stickiness in India and 
Policy Implications 
 
It is not easy to assess the relative importance of the factors behind lending rate 
stickiness in an economy from a small time series data. Most of the structural 
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factors identified by researchers change slowly in the short-run and their real 
impact can only be assessed from a long time series, which is not available. The 
discussions that follow in this section, therefore, need to be interpreted with 
caution.  
 
Figure 2
Movements in Impact Multiplier (IMPMUL) and Long-Run Multiplier (LONGMUL)
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
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In the Indian context, some of the factors behind lending rate stickiness could be 
(i) lack of sufficient competition in the banking sector, (ii) lack of sufficient 
development of the financial markets, (iii) ownership structure of the banks, (iv) 
downward rigidity of the deposit rates and the resultant pressure on the spread 
and profitability of the banking sector and, (v) inelastic credit demand. In what 
follows, we analyze the potential contributions of these factors.  
 
4.1 The Lack of Sufficient Competitiveness in the Banking Sector 
 
The lack of sufficient competition among the banks is likely to lead to lending rate 
stickiness. An environment characterized by the monopolistic structure may not 
induce the banks to reduce the lending rate in response to the changes in official 
rates. Similarly, in cases of oligopoly, smaller banks may not be willing to initiate 
an interest rate cut.  Internationally, to what extent the degree of competition 
affects lending rate stickiness is debated. For example, while Cottarelli and 
Kouleris (1994) did not find market concentration a significant factor behind 
lending rate stickiness, a key factor attributed by Moazzami (1999) for an 
explanation of the different degrees of lending rate stickiness in the US and 
Canada is market concentration. 
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The degree of competition within the banking system is either measured by the 
market shares of a few large banks and the number of bank branches per 
population. In the Indian context, market concentration is perceived to be high 
due to the large size of the State Bank of India (SBI) and its associates.   
However, market concentration measures are generally not good proxies for the 
actual degree of competition if there is no barrier in entry of new competitors at 
the macro level or at the branch level. In India, the regulatory framework provides 
no barrier as in some countries like the US (Moazzami, 1999). Also, the number 
of different banks as well as bank branch penetration in India is high compared to 
many developing economies implying lack of competition may not be that 
relevant in the Indian context. 
 
In the Indian context, there is evidence that during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
competitiveness of the banking sector has increased. For example, Bhattacharya 
and Das (2003) have observed a clear downward trend in the HHI of bank assets 
during the 1990s. So far as competitive pressure is concerned, different 
measures of spreads of banking sector also show a clear decreasing trend in the 
1990s. Further, results in Prasad and Ghosh (2005b) pertaining to the period 
1996–2004 suggest that the Indian banks had operated during that period under 
competitive conditions. The banking market structure identified in this study 
resembled monopolistic competition. Although we do not address the relative 
contribution of this factor empirically, it is possible to hypothesize that the change 
in banking market conditions was an important factor behind the recent reduction 
in lending rate stickiness in India in recent years.   
 
 
4.2 Lack of Sufficient Development of Financial Market 
 
In the literature, a standard approach to measure the overall degree of financial 
development is to examine the trends in the ratio between financial assets and 
GDP. As the data on aggregate financial assets in a country are not readily 
available, some other measures used are (i) the ratio between broad money and 
GDP and (ii) the ratio between broad and narrow money. Increases in these 
ratios over time indicate increase in financial innovations during the period. 
 
In the Indian context, the ratio between broad money (M3) and nominal GDP was 
0.52 in 1990-91, 0.56 in 1996-97 and 0.85 in 2005-06. Similarly, the ratio 
between broad money (M3) and narrow money (M1) was 2.86 in March 1991, 
2.89 in March 1997, but increased to 3.31 in March 2006. The growth of these 
ratios indicates increase in financial innovations.  This suggests that, in case 
lending rate stickiness is on account of lack of development of financial markets, 
then over the period response of lending rate to the changes in policy rates 
should improve. 
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4.3 Downward Rigidity of the Deposit Rates 
 
If the banks are not in a position to effect cut in their deposit rate, this may lead to 
rigidities in lending rate movements.  Keeping other aspects aside, prime lending 
rate should be equal to the deposit rate plus (minimum) margin essential to meet 
operational expenditure.  Thus, once the margins are squeezed to the minimum 
level, further reductions in the lending rate may not be feasible unless the deposit 
rate also changes by similar magnitude.  The dependence of the banks to adjust 
lending rate as a response to the changes in official short-term interest rate 
would also depend upon the magnitude of the refinance window available to 
them.   
 
In this context, it may be noted that despite moving towards a market determined 
interest rate regime, a minimum floor on the interest rate on savings deposit in 
India has been maintained during the reference period. A related factor that could 
also influence the behavior of the lending rate in India is the behavior of the 
administered rates on small-scale savings. The rates of interest offered on these 
instruments compete directly with the banking sector instruments. The study of 
Bhattacharya and Singh (2001) reveals that a 100 basis point change in these 
rates typically leads to about 40 basis point change in the deposit rates of the 
banking sector. Thus, whenever the administered rates on small-scale savings 
change, the spread between the deposit and the lending rates also change. It 
may be noted that it is this spread that generates net interest income of the 
banking sector and could be an important determinant of the lending rate.   
 
4.4 Inelastic Credit Demand 
 
The transaction and information costs facing banks affect their willingness to 
respond to policy impulses. Banks favor changing the lending rate when they are 
certain that the change in the official rate is a permanent one. However, as this 
can not be decided instantaneously, a simpler way is to adopt a 'wait and watch' 
policy. A major factor that determines the response time is the cost of making the 
wrong choice. Whenever a bank reacts to a change in the overnight rate, it incurs 
adjustment costs. The degree to which these adjustment costs delay the 
response of lending rates to changes in money market rates depends on the 
elasticity of demand for bank loans (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994, p. 590). 
 
Elasticity of demand for credit with respect to the interest rate may also be one of 
the factors affecting the stickiness of lending rate.  In case demand for credit is 
inelastic, banks will not be tempted to change lending rate immediately with the 
change in BR, since it does not affect their borrower‟s behaviour.  On the 
contrary, in case of high elasticity (of demand for credit with respect to lending 
rate), banks would be inclined to switch lending rates, more frequently. 
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To find out the elasticity of demand for credit in India, a demand for credit 
equation has been specified. The log of real credit (ROBCCS) is used as a 
dependent variable in the equation. To obtain real credit, nominal credit – 
measured in terms of other bank credit to commercial sector in the monetary 
series – has been deflated by the WPI. In the specification, logarithm of IIP (LIIP) 
and LENDRATE have been used as explanatory variables. A rise in IIP would 
lead to a rise in real credit while an increase in interest rate would act as an 
impediment. Thus the signs of the two coefficients are expected to be positive 
and negative respectively. The estimated equation is presented below: 
 
 
(5)    ROBCCS =  1.8853 + 1.4306 LIIP  – 0.0728 LENDRATE 
                                         (3.39)#     (17.27)#                    (–5.91)#  
           R-SQ = 0.95, R-BAR SQ = 0.95, DW-STATISTIC = 0.97 
 
Equation (5) reveals a good fit. However, the DW-Statistic appears to be not very 
satisfactory, indicating some inappropriateness in the equation, in terms of its 
specifications. The important point to note is that lending rate reveals the desired 
impact, through its effect is relatively very small. 
 
 
5   Conclusion  
 
The paper explored the nature, extent and stability of lending rate stickiness in 
India. The paper found evidence of lending rate stickiness, but also observed that 
in an environment of continuous financial reforms, such stickiness could be 
changing over the period. During the major part of the reference period, the Bank 
Rate has been used by the Indian monetary authorities to signal its intention and 
the practice – even after the introduction of LAF. As a result, the long-term rates 
like the lending rate did not react sufficiently to the changes in the reverse repo 
rates unless the Bank Rate was also changed, at least during the initial years. 
The Indian experience, therefore, is a good example of discount rate addiction.  
 
So far as the changes in The Bank Rate is concerned, results based on the post-
April-1997 data revealed that a 100 basis point change in the Bank Rate on an 
average led to 25–45 basis points contemporaneous change and 70–90 basis 
points long-run change in the lending rate. Historical data suggest that a similar 
change in Reverse Repo Rate alone ushered changes that were much smaller. 
During the major part of our reference period, however, both the rates were used 
simultaneously by the monetary authorities for different purposes. When the 
impact of both the rates are studied together, our study reveals that during the 
recent period the stickiness in lending rate seems to have decreased, as a 
change of 100 basis points each of both these rates could change the lending 
rate almost by similar magnitude.  
 
These results have serious implications for the transmission of monetary policy in 
India. Cross-country studies like Mahadeva and Sinclair (2001) noted earlier that 
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the modest coefficients of the policy rates point to the possibility of deliberate 
long-run rate smoothing by the banks and remarked that the monetary 
transmission channel that ran from loan rates to private sector investment and 
consumption spending would not be very strong in countries like India. Prasad 
and Ghosh (2005a), in contrast, had obtained an increasing role of interest rates 
in the monetary policy transmission mechanism in India in recent years. Our 
study could explain this puzzle through a demonstration of decrease in lending 
rate stickiness in India. Our analysis, however, suggests that the low elasticity of 
credit demand in India could be an impediment in further decline of lending rate 
stickiness. As due to demographic factor, demand for personal and housing 
loans in India are likely to increase in future, it is likely that such increase could 
tend to increase inflexibility in loan rates.  
 
Incidentally, a limitation of this study is the brief time span over which the 
analysis is based. As the journey to a market determined interest rate regime is a 
relatively new development in India, such limitations can not be avoided. Further, 
as the change in signal mechanism through Reverse Repo Rates (in place of 
Bank Rate) is a recent development, it is likely that currently lending rate 
stickiness is going through another important structural change in India. It is 
difficult to hypothesize to what extent the stickiness would change in the coming 
years, but the new paradigm could usher important changes in relative 
contributions of the discount rate and the Reverse Repo Rate in affecting the 
lending rate. So far as policies are concerned, the results reported in this paper, 
therefore, need to be interpreted with caution and monitored on continuous basis.  
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